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PIECEMEAL FREEDOM: WHY THE 
HEADSCARF BAN REMAINS IN  
PLACE IN TURKEY 
KERIME SULE AKOGLU* 
Abstract: The intersection of religion and politics has always been a volatile 
subject in Turkey. From the first years of the Republic to the present day, politi-
cal leaders have had to balance the secular interests of the state with the religious 
beliefs of the public. Historically, it has been the religious public who has carried 
the brunt of this balancing act, specifically women. For decades, Muslim women 
wearing headscarves for religious reasons were fenced out of the public sphere 
because of a belief that their outwardly manifested religious beliefs threatened 
the secular structure of the Republic. They could not attend schools, hold office, 
or work in government offices if they chose to wear a headscarf. In 2013, most of 
these barriers were lifted through a by-law allowing headscarf-wearing women to 
work in most government offices. Although a step in the right direction, the by-
law falls short of creating an equal space for all women as it continues to keep 
headscarf-wearing women out of crucial state offices, including the military, the 
judiciary, and the police force. With such limitations, the by-law reinforces the 
belief that headscarf-wearing women are not welcome in all public spaces. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 2013, a group of teachers and their eighth grade students 
went to a military dining facility in Istanbul for a dinner event.1 Everyone was 
allowed entrance into the facility, except for a female teacher wearing a head-
scarf.2 Senior military officers told her that she would either have to take off 
her headscarf or be denied entrance.3 Although the woman tried to reason with 
the officers and reminded them of her rights, she was forced to leave the facili-
ty.4 Today, a headscarf-wearing woman in Turkey is denied entrance into cer-
tain state facilities solely because her appearance expresses religious belief.5 
                                                                                                                           
 * Kerime Sule Akoglu is the Editor in Chief for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. 
 1 Necip Salacan, Headscarved Teacher Denied Entry to Military Facility Despite Directive, TO-
DAY’S ZAMAN (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action; jses-
sionid=3F9EC2A91CE9C4168106B9B115BF2F76?newsId=333230, archived at https://perma.cc/
5TSK-X2SQ?type=source. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
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In its efforts to offer democratizing reforms, the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP), Turkey’s ruling party, unveiled a new “democratization package” 
in September 2013.6 The proposed reforms included implementing changes to 
the electoral system, imposing harsher punishment for hate crimes, improving 
the rights of Kurds, and finally, removing restrictions on the wearing of Islam-
ic headscarves, among many others.7 Whereas most of the proposed reforms 
have not yet been implemented, the government has already removed the ban 
on headscarves through a by-law.8 Because of the by-law, women can now 
work at government offices while wearing headscarves.9 Although many Turks 
applauded the reform, a caveat remains: the restriction remains in place for 
women who work in the judiciary, the military, and the police force.10 As long 
as such restrictions remain, the plight of women’s rights in Turkey remains on 
unequal footing.11 
Part I of this Note explores Turkish political history and the role secular-
ism plays in Turkish law-making. This Part also outlines the decades-long re-
strictions on women’s dress. Part II discusses the European Court of Human 
Rights’ opinion regarding the headscarf ban in Turkey, the treatment of head-
scarf-wearing women in politics, and the “democratization” efforts in Turkey, 
specifically the recent by-law lifting the headscarf ban in most government 
offices. In Part III, this Note argues that the current by-law is not only insuffi-
cient, but it, ironically, reinforces the same discriminatory practice towards 
headscarf-wearing women that it tries to correct. Finally, this Note concludes 
that if Turkey is fully committed to democracy and assuring equal rights to its 
citizens, all women must be given the same rights, without differentiating be-
tween those who wear a headscarf and those who do not. 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Egemen Bagis, AK Party’s New Democratization Package: Politics Without Shackles, Democ-
racy Without Obstacles, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/egemen-
bagis/ak-partys-new-democratiza_b_4029185.html, archived at https://perma.cc/A4B8-R8MC?type=
image. 
 7 PM Introduces Landmark Reforms, But Admits More Needs to Be Done, TODAY’S ZAMAN 
(Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.todayszaman.com/news-327738-govt-unveils-reform-package-to-boost-
democracy-headscarf-ban-removed.html, archived at https://perma.cc/L2UW-MLAE?type=source. 
 8 RESMI GAZETE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE], Oct. 8, 2013, No. 28789, Decision No. 2013/5443; Seb-
nem Arsu & Dan Bilefsky, Turkey Lifts Longtime Ban on Head Scarves in State Offices, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 9, 2013, at A9. According to Article 24 of the Constitution, “[t]he Prime Ministry, the ministries, 
and public corporate bodies may issue by-laws in order to ensure the implementation of laws and 
regulations relating to their jurisdiction, as long as they are not contrary to these laws and regula-
tions.” 1982 CONST. art. 124. 
 9 Arsu & Bilefsky, supra note 8. 
 10 See RESMI GAZETE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE], 8 Oct. 2013, No. 28789, Decision No. 2013/5443; 
Daniel Dombey, Turks Applaud Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Easing of Headscarf Ban, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 
8, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7098fe8a-3030-11e3-80a4-00144feab7de.html# axzz2wjM9
xUag, archived at https://perma.cc/WQ8C-V3MK?type=pdf. 
 11 Richard Peres, A History of the Headscarf Ban in Turkey, TURKISH REV., Sept/Oct 2012, at 34. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the Ottomans started an era of moderniza-
tion and reforms, called the Tanzimat reforms.12 The reforms transformed Ot-
toman society and the relationship between the government and the people.13 
The debates surrounding modernization focused on whether the empire could 
be saved by adoption of Western ideas or by stricter adherence to the state’s 
interpretation of Islamic values.14 In the end, Western ideology won over tradi-
tion and the Tanzimat reforms became the first real vehicle for secularism en-
tering the Turkish stage.15 Whereas religious education and law had held the 
uppermost rank in society, it started to decline and was overtaken by Western 
liberalism.16 The reforms, however, were not enough to save the empire from 
its looming death at the end of World War I.17 
A. Birth of Kemalism: Turkish Secularism 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding father and first president of modern 
Turkey, saved the last remaining soil of the Ottoman Empire from being com-
pletely overtaken by rebellious groups and Western forces.18 Riding on the 
popularity he had deservedly won in the battlefield, Atatürk abolished the Ot-
toman regime and the Islamic caliphate and started an audacious set of reforms 
to build a new country.19 Atatürk believed that Turks could come out of the 
destruction of the Ottoman Empire as a more modern, secular, and, important-
ly, European society.20 
In changing the culture of the Turks to fit the European notions of moder-
nity, Atatürk first banned the fez, a crimson headgear that had become a sym-
bol of Muslim identity in the Ottoman world, and replaced it with a require-
ment that men wear a Western-styled hat.21 Next, Atatürk banned all religious 
attire other than in places of worship.22 In his public speeches, Atatürk made it 
                                                                                                                           
 12 ALI CARKOGLU & ERSIN KALAYCIOGLU, TURKISH DEMOCRACY TODAY: ELECTIONS, PRO-
TEST AND STABILITY IN AN ISLAMIC SOCIETY 8 (2007); see also Susanna Dokupil, The Separation of 
Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy in Modern Turkey, 105 W.VA. L. REV. 53, 61–62 (2002). 
 13 CARKOGLU & KALAYCIOGLU, supra note 12, at 9. 
 14 Dokupil, supra note 12, at 62. 
 15 See CARKOGLU & KALAYCIOGLU, supra note 12, at 8. 
 16 Id. at 8–9; see Dokupil, supra note 12, at 65. 
 17 CARKOGLU & KALAYCIOGLU, supra note 12, at 11–12. 
 18 Dokupil, supra note 12, at 65. 
 19 See STEPHEN KINZER, CRESCENT AND STAR: TURKEY BETWEEN TWO WORLDS 40–43 (2008). 
 20 Id. at 40. 
 21 Id. at 42; Dokupil, supra note 12, at 70; Benjamin D. Bleiberg, Note, Unveiling the Real Issue: 
Evaluating the European Court of Human Rights’ Decision to Enforce the Turkish Headscarf Ban in 
Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 134–35 (2005). 
 22 Bleiberg, supra note 21, at 135. 
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clear that he saw the headscarf as strange and barbaric.23 He said, “[i]t is a 
spectacle that makes the nation an object of ridicule. It must be remedied at 
once.”24 Dress reform was an important factor in assuming a European identity 
and convincing the Western world of the Turks’ commitment to adopting West-
ern notions of modernity.25 
Atatürk continued to implement other changes throughout his reign.26 
These included changing the Turkish language from Arabic script to Latin let-
ters; giving women the rights to vote and to hold office; banning the broadcast 
of Oriental music; and requiring the Arabic call to prayer, the ezan, to be recit-
ed in Turkish.27 The government, which was in the sole control of Atatürk’s 
party, implemented all of these changes swiftly and without much debate.28 
These changes broadly illustrate how Atatürk defined secularism and how 
he propelled the new country into forming a new, Western image.29 Kemalist 
secularism, based on Atatürk’s convictions, reflects a type of secularism that is 
hostile to religion in the public sphere—it does not aim to create a separation 
between state and religion, but instead aims to ban religion in the public 
space.30 Atatürk saw this version of secularism as one of the pillars that would 
ensure the safety and dignity of the new nation.31 This Kemalist secularism is 
woven into Turkish law and continues to shape political and legal debates.32 
B. Multiparty Politics & Military Coups 
The first multiparty elections held in 1946 brought with them a new polit-
ical party and the start of real debates about the place of religion in public 
life.33 The Democrat Party (DP) represented a more tolerant approach to reli-
gious expression, driven by an effort to win rural votes.34 The party came to 
rule Turkish politics for ten years, taking the reins from Atatürk’s party, the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP).35 The DP’s tenure in politics led to the re-
                                                                                                                           
 23 KINZER, supra note 19, at 42. 
 24 Id. at 42–43. 
 25 See Valorie K. Vojdik, Politics of the Headscarf in Turkey: Masculinities, Feminism, and the 
Construction of Collective Identities, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 661, 676, 678 (2010). 
 26 See KINZER, supra note 19, at 43. 
 27 Id. at 43–44. 
 28 See NICOLE POPE & HUGH POPE, TURKEY UNVEILED: A HISTORY OF MODERN TURKEY 61–
62, 67 (2011). 
 29 Dokupil, supra note 12, at 65. 
 30 Id. at 69, 70; see AHMET T. KURU, SECULARISM AND STATE POLICIES TOWARD RELIGION: 
THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND TURKEY 168 (2009). 
 31 See KINZER, supra note 19, at 43. 
 32 See id. at 47; see also Dokupil, supra note 12, at 71. 
 33 See Dokupil, supra note 12, at 71–72. 
 34 See Ronnie Marguiles & Ergin Yildizoglu, The Political Uses of Islam in Turkey, MIDDLE 
EAST REP., Jul.–Aug. 1988, at 13–14. 
 35 Id. at 13. 
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turn of the Arabic recitation of the ezan, the legalization of Qur’an recitations 
on the radio, and religious teaching in secondary schools.36 Thus, under the 
rule of the DP, bans on religious expression were slowly lifted and the practice 
of religion was no longer frowned upon by the state.37 
By the end of the DP’s rule, Turkey faced a worsened economy, a politi-
cal party sensitive to criticism, and a military disturbed by the abandonment of 
Kemalist values.38 In 1960, a military coup overthrew the DP and a military 
tribunal executed the prime minister for treason.39 This was the first of a pat-
tern of military coups in Turkey.40 
The ensuing decade brought a new set of parties to the political stage and 
with it new political drama.41 Whereas the traditional political divide had been 
over religion and secularism, the new political split shifted to left-right poli-
tics.42 Political demonstrations started to shake the country with violent and 
even deadly effects.43 The government in control was unable to curb the vio-
lence erupting on the streets and on college campuses.44 In 1971, the military 
intervened once again, this time using an ultimatum rather than military 
tanks.45 The Chief of General Staff handed the prime minister a memorandum 
demanding the formation of a strong and credible government, which could 
end the “anarchy” and set reforms “in a Kemalist spirit.”46 In an effort to re-
store law and ensure socio-economic reforms, the government came under the 
control of technocrats outside the political establishment—ushered in with the 
support of the military.47 Within two years, however, multiparty elections 
landed the country back into the hands of politicians and created a coalition 
government.48 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Id. at 13–14. 
 37 Id. at 14. 
 38 KINZER, supra note 19, at 61; Dokupil, supra note 12, at 76. 
 39 KINZER, supra note 19, at 61. 
 40 Dokupil, supra note 12, at 76. 
 41 See POPE & POPE, supra note 28, at 98–102. 
 42 Id. at 100–01. The “left-right” politics refers to the general political ideological scale. Whereas 
major political debates had been divided between religion and secularism, the political atmosphere 
shifted to focus on political parties and their socio-economic dimensions. To understand left-right 
ideology and positioning of parties in Turkey, however, it is still very much important to understand 
the religious-secular divide. See Abdullah Aydogan & Jonathan B. Slapin, Left Right Reversed: Par-
ties and Ideology in Modern Turkey (forthcoming) (manuscript 2–3) available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2165409, archived at https://perma.cc/4SPL-BKGT?type=
image. 
 43 See POPE & POPE, supra note 28, at 101–02. 
 44 ERIK J. ZURCHER, TURKEY: A MODERN HISTORY 271 (1993). 
 45 POPE & POPE, supra note 28, at 103; ZURCHER, supra note 44, at 271. 
 46 ZURCHER, supra note 44, at 271. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 274. 
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The 1970s were a hard time for Turkey, politically and economically.49 
The National Salvation Party (MSP) was born, representing the conservative 
religious faction.50 The party blamed the dominance of Western culture in the 
country for the loss of Turkish power and influence in global affairs.51 They 
proposed a return to the Muslim heritage of the Ottoman Empire while com-
mitting to technological advancements.52 Necmettin Erbakan, the founder and 
leader of the MSP, had an entirely different view of the role of secularism from 
the Kemalists.53 He expressed admiration for Islamic states and argued that 
Turkey could adopt Western technology without bowing down to Western cul-
ture and losing its Islamic values.54 
While the MSP was leading its anti-secular, anti-Western campaign, the 
country was in civil disarray.55 Political and ethnic violence between left and 
right, Turk and Kurd, and Sunni and Alevi Muslim polarized the country.56 
Events outside of Turkey, specifically the Iranian Revolution, also threatened 
Turkey’s internal affairs.57 The military generals once again grew uneasy with 
the state of Turkish politics and plotted to intervene.58 
In 1980, with the third military coup in Turkey’s history, the military took 
control of the Turkish government.59 The military said it was their duty to pro-
tect the Republic from what they believed would amount to a civil war.60 This 
military coup differed from the previous two coups in a few ways.61 First, un-
like the first two coups, it had support from at least some segments of the pub-
lic, who saw it as the only way to attain stability after a decade of civil unrest 
and political violence.62 Second, this coup was much more extensive than 
those of 1960 and 1971.63 General Kenan Evren dissolved parliament, sus-
pended all political parties and professional organizations, and started legal 
proceedings against several party leaders.64 Specifically, in relation to religious 
                                                                                                                           
 49 POPE & POPE, supra note 28, at 124–26. 
 50 Dokupil, supra note 12, at 81. 
 51 Id. at 85. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 86, 88. 
 54 Id. at 87, 88. 
 55 Id. at 91. 
 56 POPE & POPE, supra note 28, at 131; Dokupil, supra note 12, at 91. 
 57 POPE & POPE, supra note 28, at 135; Dokupil, supra note 12, at 91. 
 58 Dokupil, supra note 12, at 91; see also POPE & POPE, supra note 28, at 135–37. 
 59 See POPE & POPE, supra note 28, at 138. 
 60 Id. at 139–40. 
 61 See Dokupil, supra note 12, at 93. 
 62 See POPE & POPE, supra note 28, at 140; Dokupil, supra note 12, at 93. 
 63 Dokupil, supra note 12, at 93. 
 64 Id. 
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expression, the military enacted new dress by-laws that prohibited students and 
staff in schools from wearing any type of headscarf.65 
 General Evren and his fellow generals believed that the coups of the past 
had been too liberal; they would fix this by writing a new constitution.66 To-
day, Turkey uses this 1982 Constitution as the basis of its governance.67 
C. The Constitution & Religious Freedom 
The preamble of the Turkish Constitution states that the Constitution is 
“in line with the concept of nationalism introduced by the founder of the Re-
public of Turkey, Atatürk, the immortal leader and the unrivalled hero, and his 
reforms and principles.”68 Article 2 states, “The Republic of Turkey is a demo-
cratic, secular and social state governed by rule of law . . . loyal to the nation-
alism of Atatürk.”69 These two statements demonstrate the lasting effect of 
Atatürk’s legacy in forming the constitutional ideology of the Republic.70 For 
example, though secularism is never explicitly defined in the Constitution, the 
ruling elites have remained committed to Atatürk’s ideology to shape their in-
terpretations—showing that commitment to Atatürk is paramount in constitu-
tional interpretation.71 
1. Interpreting the Constitution in the Kemalist State 
The formation of the Republic by Atatürk and the formation of the 1982 
Constitution were both accomplished through a top-down approach by power-
ful state institutions, specifically the military.72 In order to guard against chal-
lenges to the structure of the state by elected officials who may be swayed by 
democratic pressure from below, the state relies upon its permanent bureaucra-
cy.73 The permanent bureaucracy is composed of the judiciary (which includes 
prosecutors), the military, and certain parts of the policing apparatus.74 It is 
these institutions, not elected officials, that are seen as the guardians of the 
founding ideological commitments of the state.75 This explains how the mili-
                                                                                                                           
 65 RESMI GAZETE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE], Oct. 25, 1982, No. 17849, Decision No. 8/5195; 
Bleiberg, supra note 21, at 140.  
 66 POPE & POPE, supra note 28, at 144. 
 67 Adrien Katherine Wing & Ozan O. Varol, Is Secularism Possible in a Majority-Muslim Coun-
try?: The Turkish Example, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 21 (2006). 
 68 1982 CONST. pmbl. 
 69 Id. art. 2. 
 70 Id. pmbl., art. 2; see also Wing & Varol, supra note 67, at 22–23. 
 71 See Bleiberg, supra note 21, at 138–42; Asli U. Bali, The Perils of Judicial Independence: 
Constitutional Transition and the Turkish Example, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 235, 279 (2012). 
 72 Id. at 270, 278. 
 73 Id. at 277. 
 74 Id. at 279. 
 75 Id. 
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tary has been able to take control of past governments and punish politicians 
for what they viewed as threats to the Kemalist establishment.76 
The Constitution requires that judges be independent in the “discharge of 
their duties” and that they give “judgment in accordance with the Constitution, 
[the] laws, and their personal conviction conforming with the law.”77 The Con-
stitution provides for several different courts, but the entity that examines the 
constitutionality of laws is the Constitutional Court.78 The court has the author-
ity to examine “the constitutionality, in respect of both form and substance, of 
laws, decrees having the force of law and . . . decide on individual applications 
[to the court].”79 Until the constitutional amendments of 2010, the court re-
viewed appeals brought only by government officials.80 By not allowing ordi-
nary citizens to petition the court, the court has “served to protect state prerog-
atives rather than individual rights.”81 
2. Religion in the Constitution 
Though the extent of the demarcation of religious expression is unclear in 
practice, the Turkish Constitution includes important sections regarding reli-
gion and secularism.82 Article 24 of the Constitution covers the freedom of 
religion and conscience.83 It states, “[e]veryone has the freedom of conscience, 
religious belief and conviction.”84 It continues, “[n]o one shall be . . . blamed 
or accused because of his religious beliefs and convictions.”85 The Article is 
modified by the following statement: 
[n]o one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious 
feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any matter whatsoever, 
for the purpose of personal or political interest or influence, or for 
even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, 
and legal order of the State on religious tenets.86 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See id. at 279–80. Indeed, the military is charged with protecting the nation from both external 
and internal threats. See Malcolm Cooper, The Legacy of Atatürk: Turkish Political Structures and 
Policy-Making, 78 INT’L AFF. 115, 120 (2002). The military has evaluated threats to the secular nature 
of the Republic to be internal threats against which it has a right to act. Id. 
 77 1982 CONST. art. 138. 
 78 Id. art. 148. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Bali, supra note 71, at 310; see 1982 CONST. art. 148. 
 81 Bali, supra note 71, at 310. 
 82 See 1982 CONST. art. 14, 24; Bleiberg, supra note 21, at 138–40. 
 83 1982 CONST. art. 24. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
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The terms “exploit or abuse religion” are not defined.87 Moreover, Article 24 is 
limited by Article 14, which states, 
[n]one of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall 
be exercised in the form of activities aiming to violate the indivisi-
ble integrity of the State with its territory and nation, and to endan-
ger the existence of the democratic and secular order of the Republic 
based on human rights.88 
Here, freedoms are limited by the potential threat they may cause to the struc-
ture of the state, specifically its secular nature.89 The constitutional limitations 
on religious expression, however, are unclear because they are not explicitly 
defined.90 
The preamble and the above Articles demonstrate that the complete sepa-
ration of state and religion is crucial to the nature of the Republic as set forth 
in the Constitution.91 Ironically, however, the Constitution in Article 136 cre-
ates an institutional body for religious affairs, the Presidency of Religious Af-
fairs.92 The institution continues the traditional role of the Sheikh ul-Islam in 
the Ottoman Empire.93 The duties of the office include the administration of 
mosques, the appointment of imams, and the dissemination of the official in-
terpretation of Islam for the public.94 The existence of such an institutional 
body suggests that the state has been unable to break from its ties to religion 
completely and has resorted to controlling how religion is promoted through its 
own agency.95 
3. Limitations on the Headscarf 
One of the first limitations of the military government on religious dress 
was through a by-law, the By-Law Concerning the Dress of Students and Staff 
in Schools.96 In 1984, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the by-law 
was constitutional because “[b]eyond being a mere innocent practice, wearing 
the headscarf is in the process of becoming the symbol of a vision that is con-
                                                                                                                           
 87 Bleiberg, supra note 21, at 139. 
 88 1982 CONST. art. 14. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Bleiberg, supra note 21, at 139. 
 91 See 1982 CONST. pmbl., arts. 14, 24. 
 92 See id. art. 136. 
 93 Dokupil, supra note 12, at 69; Kurulus ve Tarihi Gelisim, Turkiye Cumhuriyet Basbakanlik 
Diyanet Baskanligi, http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/tr/kategori/kurumsal/1 (last visited Apr. 7, 2015), ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/L3U6-7T39?type=source. 
 94 Dokupil, supra note 12, at 128. 
 95 Gunes Murat Tezcur, Constitutionalism, Judiciary, and Democracy in Islamic Societies, 39 
POLITY 479, 488 (2007); see Dokupil, supra note 12, at 94–95. 
 96 Sahin v. Turk., 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, 187 (2005). 
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trary to the freedoms of women and the fundamental principles of the Repub-
lic.”97 
After civil politics returned, the by-laws were eased.98 Section 16 of the 
Higher Education Act in 1988 allowed the wearing of “a veil or headscarf cov-
ering the neck and hair . . . out of religious conviction” in educational institu-
tions.99 This freedom, however, was short-lived when, only three months after 
its enactment, the Constitutional Court held the law to be unconstitutional for 
violating the secular principles of the country.100 The court, in its opinion, stat-
ed that an individual’s religious expressions could be limited in the public 
sphere in order to protect the principle of secularism.101 The court also stated 
that because Turkey is a Muslim-majority country, those not wearing a head-
scarf would “undoubtedly [be] regarded as opposed to religion or as non-
religious.”102 In the opinion of the court, reversal of the law was necessary to 
sustain a “tolerant and mutually supportive atmosphere without being deflected 
from that goal by signs of religious affirmation.”103 
In 1990, the government once again tried to ease the restrictions on reli-
gious dress by enacting Section 17 of the Higher Education Act.104 This law 
stated, “[c]hoice of dress shall be free in institutions of higher education, pro-
vided that it does not contravene the laws in force.”105 The law was reviewed 
once again by the Constitutional Court.106 This time the court upheld the law 
because of the conditional phrasing that the dress not contravene the laws in 
force.107 The court stated, “[t]he judgment of the Constitutional Court estab-
lishes that covering one’s neck and hair with the headscarf is first and foremost 
contrary to the Constitution.”108 Therefore, the law in question could not allow 
any dress that the law had already declared to be unlawful.109 
In 1999, a Constitutional Court judgment declared that the legislative and 
executive branches are bound by the judgments of the court.110 The court effec-
tively stated that the legislature could not pass future legislation easing the ban 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Id. 
 98 See Bleiberg, supra note 21, at 141. 
 99 Sahin, 2005-XI at 187. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 188. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 189. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 191. 
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on the headscarf because the court’s past judgments explicitly stated that laws 
allowing headscarves were unlawful and unconstitutional.111 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Leyla Sahin v. Turkey: The ECtHR Evaluates the Headscarf Ban 
In 1993, Leyla Sahin enrolled at the Faculty of Medicine at Bursa Univer-
sity.112 For the first four years of her time at the university, she wore a head-
scarf to school.113 In her fifth year, Sahin transferred to the Cerrahpasa Faculty 
of Medicine at Istanbul University.114 In 1998, the Vice-Chancellor of Istanbul 
University issued a circular declaring that, in accordance with the law, students 
wearing headscarves and students with beards would not be admitted to lec-
tures, courses, or tutorials.115 Thus, Sahin was denied access to enroll in classes 
and attend examinations.116 
The university started disciplinary proceedings against Sahin for her re-
fusal to comply with the new rules on dress.117 These disciplinary measures 
started with warnings from the Dean of the Faculty and ended with Sahin’s 
suspension from the university.118 Sahin sued the university at the Istanbul 
Administrative Court for injunctive relief to quash the decision to suspend 
her.119 The court dismissed her complaint, finding that the university’s measure 
was not illegal.120 Sahin abandoned her studies in Istanbul and enrolled in Vi-
enna University.121 She then filed an application to the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (ECtHR) alleging that the ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf in 
institutions of higher education violated her rights and freedoms under Articles 
8, 9, 10 and 14 of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (Convention) and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.122 
The ECtHR upheld the Turkish headscarf ban and held that there had 
been no violations of the alleged Articles of the Convention.123 The court first 
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evaluated Sahin’s Article 9 claim.124 Article 9 protects an individual’s freedom 
of thought, conscience, and religion, which includes, “freedom, either alone or 
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief, in worship, teaching, practice, and observance.”125 Article 9 is limited 
by the following clause: 
[f]reedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only 
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection 
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.126 
The court held that although the university’s regulations interfered with Sa-
hin’s right to manifest her religion, the interference was prescribed by law and 
was legitimate and necessary in a democratic society.127 The court pointed to 
the Turkish Constitutional Court’s judgments declaring that students’ covering 
of their neck and hair for religious reasons was contrary to the Turkish Consti-
tution.128 The ECtHR held that banning a student from attending a university 
with her headscarf was a necessary protection for other students, specifically 
those who do not wear the headscarf.129 Thus, in the court’s view, the ban was 
necessary in the pursuit of protecting the freedoms of others.130 
The ECtHR found that the claims under Articles 8, 10, and 14 of the Con-
vention raised the same questions as the Article 9 claim and held that there had 
been no violation.131 Finding the right to education to be one of “fundamental 
importance,” the court examined the Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 complaint 
separately.132Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 states: 
[n]o person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of 
any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teach-
ing, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such educa-
tion and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philo-
sophical convictions.133 
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Sahin only alleged the violation of the first sentence of the Article.134 She 
claimed that the right to education applied to higher education and thus had 
implicated her rights.135 The court held that the right applied to institutions of 
higher education as well as primary and secondary education.136 The court, 
however, held that the right had not been violated by the university’s re-
strictions.137 In the opinion of the court, Sahin was aware of the regulations in 
place at Istanbul University and the risk of being refused access to lectures, 
and yet, she still continued to wear her headscarf.138 The court stated, “[t]he 
obvious purpose of the restriction was to preserve the secular character of edu-
cational institutions.”139 Thus, the regulation did not deny the right to educa-
tion, and the university acted “judiciously” by seeking a path “whereby they 
could avoid having to turn away students wearing the headscarf and at the 
same time honour their obligation to protect the rights of others and the inter-
ests of the education system.”140 
B. Merve Kavakci: Testing the Boundaries of the Headscarf Ban in Politics 
In 1999, Merve Kavakci, a computer engineer who studied and lived in 
the United States for many years, ran as one of the parliamentary candidates of 
the Virtue Party in Turkey.141 She easily won the voters’ support and was elect-
ed into office.142 On the day she arrived in parliament to take the oath of office, 
however, the assembly ran her out of the building in protest.143 The prime min-
ister told the members of parliament to “put this woman in her place.”144 She 
had come to parliament wearing a headscarf.145 Later, on the basis that Ka-
vakci had not informed Turkish authorities of her American citizenship, the 
then-president stripped Kavakci of her Turkish citizenship on a legal technical-
ity.146 Kavakci was stripped of her citizenship a month after she was denied 
her place in office.147 
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The forced removal of Kavakci from parliament was based on a by-law 
from 1982, the years of General Evren’s rule.148 The by-law, titled “Kamu Ku-
rum ve Kuruluslarinda Calisan Personelin Kilik ve Kiyafetine Dair Yonet-
melik,” or By-law Regarding the Dress of Personnel in Public Offices, declares 
that women must keep their hair uncovered.149 The by-law has additional ele-
ments regarding women’s dress, such as a ban on wearing pants, sleeveless 
shirts, and low-cut blouses.150 The by-law has roots in the Kemalist formation 
of secularism, specifically that the public sphere is clear of religious expres-
sion.151 The application of this by-law allows women to pursue their chosen 
profession freely only if they are willing to abandon their religious dress.152 
C. Efforts to Lift the Ban in Educational Institutions 
In 2008, the governing party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), 
with the support of other parties in parliament, moved to amend the Constitu-
tion to overcome the Constitutional Court’s decisions on the headscarf.153 The 
law sought to amend Articles 10 and 42 of the Constitution in order to lift the 
ban on the headscarf.154 The change made to Article 10 was the addition of the 
statement, “[t]he state is to observe the equality principle in its provision of all 
public services.”155 The addition to Article 42 stated, “no one could be de-
prived of the right to a university education for a reason other than those ex-
plicitly stated in the laws.”156 The change was meant to allow students to wear 
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headscarves in universities because there was no constitutional principle ban-
ning headscarves, only by-laws and the court’s own judgments.157 The bill was 
passed by a vote of 441 members of parliament in favor, out of 550 total mem-
bers.158 
The main opposition party, the Republic People’s Party (CHP) applied to 
the Constitutional Court to rule on the constitutionality of the amendments.159 
They argued that the new amendments violated the principle of secularism en-
shrined in Article 2 of the Constitution.160 The court in its review of the law 
stated that the aim of the amendments was clear: to lift the ban on wearing the 
headscarf at universities.161 Relying on the ECtHR’s decision in Sahin, the 
court held that the ban on the headscarf was a legitimate one in order “to pro-
tect the rights of others in a Muslim majority country.”162 Therefore, the lifting 
of the ban was unconstitutional, as it was contrary to the principle of secular-
ism.163 
D. Deteriorating Kemalism & New Secularism 
1. Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
The AKP has been in power since 2002.164 In the last parliamentary elec-
tions of 2011, the AKP received almost 50 percent of the votes.165 One of the 
differentiating qualities of the AKP, in contrast to the many parties that have 
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held the Turkish political platform, is its interpretation of secularism.166 The 
party states that it is loyal to the principle of secularism as “an assurance of the 
freedom of religion and conscience,” but rejects “the interpretation and distor-
tion of secularism as an enmity against religion.”167 The leader of the AKP, 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has emphasized his “desire to interpret Turkish secu-
larism by analyzing the American model.”168 Nevertheless, the AKP has been 
unable to change the application of secularism in Turkish laws because of limi-
tations imposed by the CHP, the Constitutional Court, and other groups who 
favor a more Kemalist secularism.169 
Although the Constitutional Court’s decision in 2008 put a brake on the 
AKP’s legal efforts to lift the ban, it did not reflect public opinion in Turkey.170 
Turkish society remains highly religious, even after years of state-imposed 
limitations on religion.171 Public surveys indicate that only 16 percent of the 
population supports the ban on headscarves in universities.172 Thus, given the 
lack of public opposition, the AKP’s failure to act more forcefully to lift the 
ban on headscarves could reflect its fear of retribution from the military and 
the courts, which have banned past political parties for interfering with Tur-
key’s secular nature. 173 Indeed, in 2008, the AKP was threatened when the 
opposition party, the CHP, petitioned the Constitutional Court to ban the party 
from politics for anti-secular activities.174 
2. Democratization 
One of the promised reforms of the AKP has been to amend the 1982 
Constitution to reflect the public’s will as opposed to the military’s.175 In 2010, 
the AKP introduced a major package of constitutional amendments that won 
the support of the public by a referendum.176 One of the most important 
achievements of the reform package was the amendments to the judicial sys-
tem.177 The amendments increased the number of judges at the highest court 
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from eleven to seventeen, granted the parliament the authority to appoint sev-
eral judges, and curbed the power of military courts.178 Opponents of the re-
form package argue that the amendments undermine the secular foundations of 
the country and give the prime minister (the AKP leader) too much power over 
the judiciary.179 
Riding on public support, as evidenced by the referendum, the ban on 
headscarves in universities was quietly lifted.180 In a memorandum sent to Is-
tanbul University, the Council of Higher Education (YÖK), the administrative 
body in charge of institutions of higher education, declared that students wear-
ing headscarves should not be forced to leave classes under any circumstanc-
es.181 This was a different route than the one attempted in 2008; whereas be-
fore the AKP had tried to create a law making it illegal to ban headscarves in 
universities, this time they used the power of the Council of Higher Education 
to effectively state that there was no legal ban in place.182 The Council encour-
aged students across the country to file complaints to the Council about school 
officials that kept restrictions in place, promising that it would take the “neces-
sary steps.”183 
In September 30, 2013, the AKP released its new “democratization pack-
age.”184 Among others, the reforms called for expansion of political rights, ed-
ucation in languages other than Turkish in private schools, and, finally, remov-
al of the ban on the headscarf in public institutions.185 There has been both 
great support and stringent criticism for the proposed changes.186 
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On October 8, 2013, the AKP lifted the ban on headscarves for women 
working in government offices.187 The change came through a by-law, the 
same way the ban came into force.188 The new by-law effectively removed the 
sentence of the 1982 by-law banning the wearing of the headscarf by public 
officials.189 Instead, it limited the 1982 by-law’s requirement of adherence to 
uniform dress in applicable public offices to include only those who work in 
the police force, the judiciary, which includes the prosecutor’s office, and the 
military.190 Therefore, although the ban on the headscarf has been lifted for 
women in public offices, it remains in effect for any woman in the police force, 
the judiciary, the prosecutor’s office, and the military.191 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Headscarf Used as a Political Tool Sharpened by the State 
The headscarf debate has been one of the de facto battlegrounds of secu-
larism in Turkey.192 In fact, women’s dress has been one of the attributes that 
the state has used to defend its place in European society and as proof that it 
has cut ties with its Ottoman-Islamic roots since the formation of the Repub-
lic.193 From Atatürk to military generals to elected officials, the state enforced 
top-down measures in order to achieve this Western identity, specifically that 
of an unveiled woman.194 While some segments of society conformed to the 
ideal image provided by the state, a larger segment refused to shed its identity 
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and beliefs.195 In fact, according to one survey, 77.2 percent of families include 
at least one woman who wears a headscarf and 64.2 percent of women eight-
een-years-old and above wear headscarves.196 The state has also been unable to 
convince the public of the “threat” of the headscarf to the Republic.197 The ma-
jority of the Turkish public does not see the use of the headscarf as contrary to 
secularism or as a threat to the state’s secular structure.198 Thus, the headscarf 
has emerged as a “threat” to secularism not by experience or democratic con-
sensus, but artificially through the state apparatus.199 
The headscarf has been taken out of its religious context and turned into a 
political tool by the state, not by headscarf-wearing women.200 The Kemalist 
state views the headscarf as the emblem of backwardness, imposed by “radi-
cal” Islam.201 Its use and existence has been viewed as an attack on secularism, 
even though the women who wear headscarves have not made such claims.202 
Kemalists take the position that the headscarf serves as a symbol of unequal 
division of labor between men and women and isolates women, effectively 
banning them from public life.203 Ironically, it has been the headscarf-wearers 
who have sought entrance into public life but have been fenced off from partic-
ipation by Kemalists.204 The Kemalists take the position that headscarf-wearers 
are not seeking any citizenship rights, such as participating in social and eco-
nomic life, but instead are acting as agents of political Islam to disturb the sec-
ular structure of the state.205 In this debate, headscarf-wearing women effec-
tively lose their voice.206 Because they are not given a place in the debate, they 
are characterized as either being pawns of political Islamists or subordinate 
members of the family due to their outdated beliefs; i.e., Islamic values in 
comparison to Western values.207 It seems unacceptable to creators of these 
caricatures, however, that an educated woman may simply be expressing her 
pure, apolitical religious beliefs and identity through her headscarf.208 
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B. Democracy Under Threat 
When Merve Kavakci entered parliament for that brief moment in 1999, 
she felt that she was a representative for the “Anatolian women” who had been 
discriminated against for decades for their religious beliefs.209 While she 
walked down the aisle of Parliament, thinking about the democratic role she 
had earned, she was greeted with the protests of her colleagues.210 Suddenly, 
parliament was filled with the yelling of representatives who were chanting, 
“Get out! Get out!”211 The prime minister then approached the podium and 
shouted, 
[n]o one in Turkey can interfere with the dress code or the headscarf 
or the private life of a woman; however, this is not a private abode. 
This is the highest institution of the state. Those who work here 
have to abide by the laws and customs of the state. This is not a 
place to challenge the state. Please put this woman in her place!212 
This was the state of politics in Turkey in 1999.213 This moment signifies how 
democracy and its institutions are generally understood: Turkey is democratic 
because it is secular.214 Indeed, this is the Kemalist doctrine that has been 
taught in schools for more than a half a century.215 Based on this perspective, 
Turkish democracy depends on the survival of secularism.216 
As essential as secularism is to the Republic, its democratic nature is just 
as important.217 In fact, one of the core and irrevocable characteristics of the 
Republic is its democratic nature, as stated in Article 2 and Article 4.218 It 
states, “[t]he Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state gov-
erned by the rule of law.”219 There is no language in this Article to signify that 
democracy depends solely on secularism, or any indication about which char-
acteristic is more important than another.220 Moreover, Article 5 of the Consti-
tution states that in protecting the “indivisibility of the country, the Republic 
and democracy,” the state must “strive for the removal of political, economic, 
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and social obstacles which restrict the fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual.”221 The importance of democracy and the state’s duty to uphold the 
democratic nature of the Republic in the face of various obstacles is under-
scored in these three Articles of the Constitution.222 
For decades, however, the state’s exclusion of women from the public 
sphere was a form of punishment for their religious beliefs that defied the prin-
ciples stated in the above Articles.223 Secularism and the “right of society” 
trumped individual rights and democracy.224 This was evidenced by the drama 
that unfolded through the lives of not only Merve Kavakci and Leyla Sahin, 
but thousands of women just like them, either in universities or the work-
force.225 There is a growing literature in Turkey about the victims of the head-
scarf ban.226 People who have been affected by the ban can be divided into five 
different groups: (1) women expelled from their schools for wearing a head-
scarf; (2) women dismissed for nonattendance; (3) women who do not want to 
go to school, take exams, or enroll due to the headscarf ban; (4) spouses or 
family members fired from their jobs due to a headscarf-wearing woman in the 
family; (5) women unable to work in the public workforce.227 Leyla and Merve 
represent individuals who were limited in their pursuits of education and pub-
lic service by the ban, but new studies show that those affected by the ban were 
not only headscarf-wearers but also their family members, friends, and com-
munities.228 
In protecting secularism at the cost of women’s individual liberties, the 
state undercut the democratic nature of the Republic and created a mechanism 
for punishing not only women, but also whole communities for their religious 
beliefs.229 Kemalists have gone so far as to state explicitly that concessions are 
necessary in the strict protection of secularism because the secular nature of 
the state protects democracy.230 Accepting that secularism is a necessary ele-
ment for the existence of not only the Turkish Republic, but all democracies, 
                                                                                                                           
 221 Id. art. 5 (emphasis added). 
 222 See id. arts. 2, 4, 5. 
 223 See id. art. 5; RESMI GAZETE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE], Oct. 25, 1982, No. 17849, Decision No. 
8/5195; Bleiberg, supra note 21, at 163–64. 
 224 See PERES, supra note 209, at 249. 
 225 See Sahin v. Turk., 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, 205 (2005); PERES, supra note 209, at 130; Ali 
Bulac, Editorial, Basortusu Magdurlari, ZAMAN (May 14, 2005), http://www.zaman.com.tr/ali-bulac/
basortusu-magdurlari_172931.html, archived at https://perma.cc/D29V-TNRS?type=source; Peres, 
supra note 11, at 34. 
 226 Bulac, supra note 225. 
 227 Id. 
 228 See id.; Sahin, 2005-XI at 217; Dokupil, supra note 12, at 123. 
 229 See RESMI GAZETE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE], Oct. 8, 2013, No. 28789, Decision No. 2013/5443; 
RESMI GAZETE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE], Oct. 25, 1982, No. 17849, Decision No. 8/5195; Wing & Varol, 
supra note 67, at 53–54; Bulac, supra note 225. 
 230 Wing & Varol, supra note 67, at 53–54. 
298 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 38:277 
proponents of the ban have still not provided any legitimate evidence for why 
Kemalist secularism is strictly necessary.231 Instead, arguments for Kemalist 
secularism have been guided by a fear of religion and arbitrary threats that 
Turkey could slide into theocratic rule if not guarded by Kemalism.232 Moreo-
ver, these arguments lack evidence to show that every woman, or even a ma-
jority of women, who wears a headscarf does so in order to subvert the secular 
nature of the state.233 This form of secularism does not guard against actual 
threats, but instead allows for the continuation of authoritarian law-making 
based on an almost century-old modernization project.234 
Secularism may be necessary for the protection of democracy in Turkey; 
religious freedom, however, is also a founding principle of democratic socie-
ties.235 Under the application of secularism in Turkey, a citizen has the freedom 
to have a religion, “internal conviction,” but lacks the freedom to manifest her 
religion, “the expression of that conviction.”236 Even assuming that the fear 
that Turkey may slip into theocratic rule may be a valid concern, what about 
the threat to democratic governance espoused in such bans?237 Ironically, the 
secular republic behaves like the theocratic republic it fears by denying citi-
zens the right to manifest their religion.238 
C. The Ban Is Partially Lifted, the Ideology Supporting the Ban Remains 
The reform brought by the by-law of October 8, 2013 against this back-
drop of Kemalist secularism is considerable, but incomplete.239 The by-law 
supposedly lifted the ban on headscarves for women working in the public sec-
tor.240 Women working in government offices can now wear a headscarf to 
work, if they wish to do so.241 The new by-law, though applauded as correcting 
decades of discrimination, stopped short of granting women complete equality 
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within all state offices.242 Women are entitled to be treated equally everywhere 
except the judiciary, the military, and the police force.243 
There is no explanation in the by-law or the official democratization 
package announced by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) officials for 
why such a ban remains in place.244 Arguably, the reason why these three state 
offices are protected from headscarf-wearers is because they are seen as the 
guardians of the secular state.245 The acceptance of these women would, in the 
eyes of Kemalists, lead to the eventual destruction of “fragile” secularism in 
Turkey.246 The new by-law underscores the belief that headscarf-wearing 
women are unfit to serve in critical public offices because of their religious 
beliefs.247 The AKP, for all its promises and statements that it believes women 
who wear headscarves should be treated equally by the state, has effectively 
solidified the Kemalist’s position that the headscarf remains a threat to core 
institutions that uphold secularism.248 It is unclear how headscarf-wearing 
women can remain non-threatening to the Republic as they serve in parlia-
ment, hold key positions in other government agencies, teach in universities, 
but suddenly take on a fundamentalist, non-Western, anti-secular identity once 
in a courtroom, in the military, or in the police force.249 
The AKP may be fearful that interference in the state’s most important in-
stitutionally secular agencies would cause the party to face harsh consequenc-
es, particularly a ban on its existence.250 The Islamist parties of the past who 
advocated for reconciliation between the state and religion were faced with 
stiff opposition from the military and the secular elite, the custodians of Kema-
list values.251 In fact, the AKP’s own experience in 2008 is proof of this 
threat.252 After passing constitutional amendments that would allow headscarf-
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wearing students to attend universities, the Constitutional Court not only ruled 
that the amendments were unconstitutional, but also found the AKP guilty of 
anti-secular political activities.253 Though the constitutional amendments were 
invalidated, the AKP survived closure by only one vote.254 
In 2013, however, after the by-law enabling headscarf-wearing women to 
work in government offices was enacted, the officials of the Republican Peo-
ple’s Party (CHP), the stalwart of Kemalist secularism, had mixed reactions.255 
After the by-laws went into effect, four female AKP deputies declared that they 
would enter Parliament with their headscarves.256 Whereas the CHP leader ad-
vised his fellow party members to show tolerance, some members threatened 
to take action.257 The CHP’s official reaction (or lack of reaction) is proof that 
the headscarf debate has lost its past fervor and that a reactionary stance could 
cause the CHP to lose votes.258 Indeed, the days of Merve Kavakci are seen as 
bad memories that Turkey would prefer to forget.259 The public debate sur-
rounding the headscarf is now more tolerant and accepting of its inclusion in 
the public sphere.260 
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The relative ease with which headscarf-wearing women can now enter 
universities and run for political office, compared to the past, has allowed poli-
ticians to claim there is no longer a headscarf “issue” in Turkey.261 Unlike Ley-
la, who could not attend her classes, and Merve, who could not be sworn in to 
her elected position because of her headscarf, women can now attend universi-
ties and hold public office while wearing a headscarf.262 But should Turkey so 
easily forget the remaining injustices in favor of claiming victory for recent 
gains in freedom?263 Before the headscarf ban was lifted in universities, some 
scholars made the argument that though headscarf-wearing women were una-
ble to attend universities, at least they were “free to wear religious clothing in 
private or communal premises, which includes homes, streets, grocery stores, 
movie theaters, malls.”264 Moreover, threats about violence on university cam-
puses were underscored, reminding Turks of their tortured past and the “unique 
context” of universities in Turkish life.265 Yet, the predicted violence did not 
occur and universities remain intact.266 It is now more common to find scholars 
arguing that a ban in universities contradicts the “notion of a university, which 
encourages a universal platform for free opinions.”267 After the 2013 by-law, 
should Turks be satisfied by saying that at least women are free to serve in 
most public offices?268 Should Turks believe the arguments that the ban is jus-
tified on the basis of maintaining “an appearance of neutrality” in key public 
offices?269 
Without complete equality, where the judiciary, the military, and the po-
lice force are not carved out from the democratic space, women will continue 
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to face arbitrary obstacles to the realization of their fundamental rights.270 Two 
months after the by-law went into effect, a family court judge in Ankara re-
fused to hear a divorce case because the attorney representing one of the par-
ties came into the courtroom wearing a headscarf.271 According to the 
measures imposed by the by-law, the woman was not barred from representing 
her case in court while wearing her headscarf because she is a private attorney 
and not part of the judiciary.272 But the judge still postponed the case, stating 
that the headscarf is a strong religious and political symbol against secularism 
and therefore has no place in the courtroom.273 The judge postponed the case in 
order to give the attorney’s client time to find new representation.274 This is 
one example of how enforcement of the by-law has been unclear.275 
It may be the position of some that women have expanded freedoms in 
comparison to the past and therefore this episode should not be exaggerated—
the limited rights of headscarf-wearing women are a necessary sacrifice for 
democracy and for secularism.276 After all, in passing the by-law, the AKP has 
given headscarf-wearing women near equality with those who do not wear the 
headscarf.277 By keeping the ban in place in crucial state institutions, however, 
headscarf-wearing women still do not have complete equality.278 The inequali-
ties that existed before the by-law continue to exist; the only difference is that 
the inequalities are now so strictly confined that it looks as if they have been 
eliminated altogether.279 Among some circles, this has ended the debate about 
bans on the headscarf completely.280 In fact, the AKP’s current campaign plat-
form claims that it eliminated the problem faced by headscarf-wearing women 
for decades.281 
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D. A Different Perspective: “Not Enough, But Yes!” 
For the past decade, Turkey has been trying to break from its repressive 
patterns of rule and justice to democratize and transform state institutions to 
accommodate pluralism.282 Many agree that Turkey needs a new constitution 
for democratic consolidation to take place, not piecemeal amendments to the 
1982 military-era Constitution.283 Thus far, however, the AKP has been unable 
to build consensus on how to accomplish this task.284 Commentators and 
scholars, who support the democratization efforts of the AKP, but criticize their 
limitations, have taken up the slogan, “not enough, but yes.”285 
The headscarf debate is very much a part of the project for democratic 
consolidation.286 Freeing headscarf-wearing women of state-imposed barriers 
is a part of the project of unifying the interests of all Turks in forming a coun-
try capable of embracing diverse ethnic, cultural, and religious identities.287 
Currently, the headscarf bans have been removed gradually: first at educational 
institutions, then at government offices.288 The new by-law is also an effect of 
this gradual approach.289 The by-law, however, does not eradicate the existing 
inequalities completely, and it may even reinforce certain prejudices; but it still 
may not be correct to reject the reform outright.290 This gradual process could 
allow for “public argument, deliberation, and negotiation over core commit-
ments—whether legal, political, constitutional, or even religious,” and become 
a “learning process[ ] through which new meanings and political possibilities 
may be created in democratic public spheres.”291 There is a risk, however, that 
this kind of process renews conflict and polarization with every new step to-
wards change, producing repressive outcomes from those against reform.292 
Currently, it remains unclear whether the established state apparatuses would 
react more repressively toward gradual or abrupt change.293 
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CONCLUSION 
A historical review of Turkey’s past with religion and politics illustrates 
the complicated back and forth between the religious public and the secular 
state. The word “secular” has become a cornerstone of the Republic, but its 
definition remains murky, unclear, and hotly contested. Though its place is un-
alterable in the Constitution, its practice has been stuck in a time far removed 
from the present and far different from current conditions. 
The by-law of 2013, giving women the right to choose whether or not to 
wear a headscarf in government offices, does not lift the ban on headscarves 
nor does it end the almost century-old debate of secularism in Turkey. It allows 
women to be treated equally in certain parts of the public sphere, carving out 
those spaces that remain holy for the secular Republic. The by-law was both a 
reassuring gesture from the government that it has not forgotten its promise of 
democratization, but also a shock because it stopped short of complete equality 
when it was so close to accomplishing the task. Turkey needs brave and coura-
geous reform if it is to correct decades of injustice and promise a better tomor-
row. Until women are given equal rights of access to all positions in the public 
sphere, they will continue to be the sacrificial lambs in the continued fight over 
secularism. 
